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1981] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
the traditional view that economic losses are only recoverable in a
breach of warranty cause of action. It is hoped that The Survey's
treatment of these and other developments in New York law will
be of help and of interest to the New York practitioner.
CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES
ARTICLE 14A-CoMPARATIvE NEGLIGENCE
CPLR 1411: Comparative negligence statute applies to loss of
consortium action and operates to reduce consortium award by
degree of spouse's contributory negligence
In New York, a cause of action for loss of consortium is con-
sidered to be defived from, not independent of, the injured
spouse's direct cause of action.1 Consequently, prior to the enact-
' Liff v. Schildkrout, 49 N.Y.2d 622, 632, 404 N.E.2d 1288, 1291, 427 N.Y.S.2d 746, 749
(1980); see, e.g., Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 507-08, 239 N.E.2d
897, 902-03, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305, 312 (1968); Maxson v. Tomek, 244 App. Div. 604, 605, 280
N.Y.S. 319, 320 (4th Dep't 1935); cf. Reilly v. Rawleigh, 245 App. Div. 190, 191, 281 N.Y.S.
366, 367 (4th Dep't 1935) (derivative action for child's medical expenses). The loss of con-
sortium cause of action has been described as encompassing "not only loss of support or
services, [but] also ... such elements as love, companionship, affection, society, sexual rela-
tions, solace and more." Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d at 502, 239
N.E.2d at 899, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 308.
Before the widespread adoption of comparative fault principles, most jurisdictions held
that an injured spouse's contributory negligence would bar any recovery by the consortium
spouse on the ground that the loss of consortium cause of action was derived from the per-
sonal injury claim. See, e.g., Note, Torts-Action for Loss of Consortium-Husband's Con-
tributory Negligence as a Bar, 11 WAYNE L. REV. 824, 827 (1965). Commentators have criti-
cized the derivative status of loss of consortium claims, noting that such status permitted
the courts effectively to impute negligence. See, e.g., Gilmore, Imputed Negligence, 1 Wis.
L. REV. 193, 211-12 (1921); James, Imputed Contributory Negligence, 14 LA. L. REV. 340,
354-56 (1954); Love, Tortious Interference with the Parent-Child Relationship: Loss of an
Injured Person's Society and Companionship, 51 IND. L.J. 590, 630-31 (1976); note 16 infra.
Notably, the loss of consortium cause of action has been envisioned as analogous to claims
for property damage occurring when a contributorily negligent person damages his spouse's
automobile in a collision with a third party. See James, supra, at 354-56. Observing that the
spouse's negligence is not imputed to the owner of the car in an action for property damage,
commentators have argued that the loss of consortium plaintiff should not be subject to the
imputation of fault and should be treated as having an "independent" claim. See Gregory,
The Contributory Negligence of Plaintiff's Wife or Child In An Action for Loss of Services,
Etc., 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 173, 174-91 (1935); James, supra, at 354-56. One author has sug-
gested a compromise position under which consortium claims would be considered only fac-
tually derivative. Love, supra, at 630-31. Under this view, the consortium plaintiff would be
required to establish a prima facie case in favor of his spouse against the defendant. Id. The
action, however, would be considered independent for all other purposes, thus precluding
imputation to the spouse of the primary plaintiff's negligence. Id.
New York has refused to hold that consortium claims can exist independently of the
spouse's personal injury claim. See, e.g., Liff v. Schildkrout, 49 N.Y.2d 622, 632, 404 N.E.2d
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ment of New York's comparative negligence statute,2 the injured
spouse's contributory negligence, which precluded recovery under a
direct cause of action, also barred recovery under a derivative loss
of consortium cause of action.' Upon passage of the comparative
negligence statute in New York, several lower courts, citing the
derivative nature of the loss of consortium cause of action, have
reduced the consortium plaintiff's award by an amount proportion-
ate to the injured spouse's degree of culpable conduct.4 Nonethe-
less, the propriety of such a reduction had not been considered by
a New York appellate court.5 Recently, in Maidman v. Stagg,' the
1288, 1291, 427 N.Y.S.2d 746, 749 (1980). In Liff, the Court of Appeals rejected a spouse's
claim for permanent loss of consortium in a wrongful death action. Id. The Court noted that
"it [cannot] be said that a spouse's cause of action for loss of consortium exists in the com-
mon law independent of the injured spouse's right to maintain an action for injuries sus-
tained." Id.
2 CPLR 1411-1413 (1976). CPLR 1411 provides that the culpable conduct attributable
to a plaintiff or decedent will reduce an award of damages to the extent that such fault
caused the injury. CPLR 1411. The legislative history of CPLR 1411 and its accompanying
sections does not indicate an intention to expand the rights of loss of consortium plaintiffs
or to change the principles of case law regarding the attributability of culpable conduct.
Meyer v. State, 92 Misc. 2d 996, 1006, 403 N.Y.S.2d 420, 427-28 (Ct. Cl. 1978); see THiR-
TEENTH ANN. REP. OF THE JUD. CONFERENCE ON THE CPLR (1975), in TWENTY-FIRST ANN.
REP. N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE 232, 242 (1976).
1 See Maxson v. Tomek, 244 App. Div. 604, 605, 280 N.Y.S. 319, 320 (4th Dep't 1935);
cf. Reilly v. Rawleigh, 245 App. Div. 190, 191, 281 N.Y.S. 366, 367 (4th Dep't 1935) (deriva-
tive action for child's medical expenses). The overwhelming majority of contributory negli-
gence jurisdictions held that recovery in a loss of consortium action was barred by the
spouse's culpable conduct. See, e.g., Pioneer Constr. Co. v. Bergeron, 170 Cal. 474, 478-83,
462 P.2d 589, 591-94 (1969); Ross v. Cuthbert, 239 Or. 429, 435-36, 397 P.2d 529, 530-33
(1964); Desjourdy v. Mesrobian, 52 R.I. 146, 147, 158 A. 719, 719-20 (1932); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 494 (1965). Contra, Fuller v. Buhrow, 292 N.W.2d 672, 676 (Iowa 1980)
(mere concurrent negligence of injured spouse does not bar consortium spouse's recovery).
Various reasons have been advanced for this rule, including the derivative nature of the
consortium claim, the characterization of the action as an assignment of the injured spouse's
cause of action, the propriety of imputing negligence by virtue of the marital relationship,
and the fact that the rule is "well settled." Handeland v. Brown, 216 N.W.2d 574, 575-77
(Iowa 1974). The New York courts have justified their application of the rule by reiterating
the derivative nature of the consortium claim. Liff v. Schildkrout, 49 N.Y.2d 622, 632-34,
404 N.E.2d 1288, 1291-93, 427 N.Y.S.2d 746, 749-50 (1980); see, e.g., Leo v. Reile, 11 App.
Div. 2d 1083, 1083, 206 N.Y.S.2d 465, 467 (4th Dep't 1960); Balestrero v. Prudential Ins. Co.
of America, 283 App. Div. 794, 794, 128 N.Y.S.2d 295, 296 (2d Dep't 1954).
1 See, e.g., Lane v. Great Atl. & Pac. Co., N.Y.L.J., Nov. 3, 1980, at 12, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.
App. T. 1st Dep't); Abbate v. Big V Supermarkets, Inc., 95 Misc. 2d 483, 485, 407 N.Y.S.2d
821, 823 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1978); Lieberman v. Maltz, 99 Misc. 2d 112, 113, 415
N.Y.S.2d 382, 383 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Kings County 1978).
' Injured Spouse's Negligence Trims Consortium-Loss Award, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 14, 1981,
at 1, col. 2.
0 82 App. Div. 2d 299, 441 N.Y.S.2d 711 (2d Dep't 1981).
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Appellate Division, Second Department, held that a spouse's loss
of consortium damages should be reduced in proportion to the
other spouse's negligence. 7
In Maidman, the plaintiff brought suit for personal injuries
arising from an automobile accident,8 and his wife sued for loss of
consortium damages." The jury found the plaintiff seventy-five
percent at fault, and awarded his estate twenty-five percent of his
total damages.10 The wife was awarded $20,000, but the jury did
not indicate how it determined that sum.11 The defendant there-
upon requested that the jury be compelled to reveal whether the
husband's culpable conduct was considered in computing the wife's
award.12 The trial court, however, denied the defendant's request
and entered judgment for the plaintiffs.'
On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, held
that the trial judge erred in neglecting to instruct the jury to re-
duce the wife's award in proportion to her husband's negligence,
and ordered a new trial for the sole purpose of determining her
damages. 4 Writing for a unanimous court,15 Justice Rabin con-
ceded that a minority of comparative negligence jurisdictions, in
accordance with criticisms written when the contributory negli-
gence rule was prevalent, 6 had held that the loss of consortium
cause of action was an independent claim.'7 Notwithstanding such
7 Id. at 306-07, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 716.
8 Id. at 299-300, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 712. As the plaintiff was crossing the street, he was
struck by the defendant's automobile. Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. The plaintiff died of causes unrelated to the collision before the trial concluded,
and his wife was appointed temporary administratrix of the estate. Id. Since the plaintiff
had testified before his death and the court was convinced that prejudice would not result if
the trial continued, the judge refused to declare a mistrial. Id. at 307, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 716.
11 Id. at 300, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 712.
12 Id.
"Id.
Id. at 306-07, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 716.
15 Justices Damiani, Titone, and Mangano concurred in an opinion authored by Justice
Rabin. Id. at 307, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 716.
"8 Several text writers and commentators have noted that the bar of contributory negli-
gence operates unfairly by precluding innocent consortium plaintiffs from obtaining any
damages. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 125, at 892-94 (4th ed. 1971);
Gilmore, supra note 1, at 211-12; Gregory, supra note 1, at 192-93; James, supra note 1, at
354; Note, The Development of the Wife's Cause of Action for Loss of Consortium, 14
CATH. LAW. 246, 257-58 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Note, Loss of Consortium]; see note 1
supra.
17 82 App. Div. 2d 299, 304-05, 441 N.Y.S.2d 711, 714 (citing Macon v. Seaward Constr.
Co., 555 F.2d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 1977); Lantis v. Condon, 95 Cal. App. 3d 152, 155-58, 157 Cal.
1981]
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authority, Justice Rabin reasoned that because the loss of consor-
tium cause of action was "closely interconnected" to the injured
spouse's personal injury claim, both should be subject to pro rata
comparative negligence reductions.' Moreover, observed the court,
prior to the enactment of New York's comparative negligence stat-
ute, the state's courts had held that an action for loss of consor-
tium was derivative in nature.19 Justice Rabin concluded that since
the statute was not intended to alter judge-made law, it did not
affect the derivative status of loss of consortium claims.20
By deeming the action for loss of consortium to be derivative,
the second department has aligned itself with the majority of com-
parative negligence jurisdictions.2 It is submitted that such an
Rptr. 22, 23-26 (1979)).
18 82 App. Div. 2d at 305, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 715. Noting that the loss of consortium
claim, coupled with the spouse's personal injury claim, "represent[ed] the total compensable
damages" resulting from the injury to the spouse, the court found no reason to recognize an
"independent" consortium claim. Id. Moreover, characterizing the spouse's loss of consor-
tium as an indirect injury, the court noted that it would be anomalous to hold that the
injured spouse's recovery for direct personal injuries would be diminished in proportion to
his culpable conduct, but that the consortium spouse's award would be unaffected. Id. Addi-
tionally, the court distinguished those cases where one spouse has suffered personal injuries
or property damages because of the concurrent negligence of the other spouse and a third
party. Id. In such situation, the court reasoned, the non-negligent spouse has suffered a
direct injury and properly is entitled to an undiminished recoupment of losses. Id.
Notably, the Maidman court relied upon Meyer v. State, 92 Misc. 2d 996, 403 N.Y.S.2d
420 (Ct. Cl. 1978), for an analysis of the application of comparative negligence to consortium
claims. In Meyer, the plaintiff was injured when he fell from a bridge at the state university
he was attending. Id. at 997-98, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 422. He sued for damages and his father
sued for medical expenses. Id. The son was found to be 50% negligent. Id. at 1003, 403
N.Y.S.2d at 426. In directing a 50% reduction of the father's award for medical expenses,
the Court of Claims first determined that a derivative action was a suit for personal injury
within the meaning of CPLR 1411. Id. at 1004-06, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 426-28; see Constanti-
nides v. Manhattan Transit Co., 264 App. Div. 147, 151, 34 N.Y.S.2d 600, 604 (1st Dep't
1942) (father's action for medical expenses is "personal injury" within the meaning of § 37-a
of the New York General Construction Law); Bailey v. Roat, 178 Misc. 2d 870, 871, 36
N.Y.S.2d 465, 467 (Sup. Ct. Tioga County 1942) (action for medical expenses for personal
injuries is analogous to derivative action for loss of consortium). The Meyer court reasoned
that because the son's culpable conduct was "imputed" to the father, the father was entitled
to only half of the cost of the medical expenses. 92 Misc. 2d at 1004-06, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 427-
28.
9 82 App. Div. 2d at 302, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 713.
-0 Id. at 306, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 715; see note 2 supra.
21 See, e.g., Eggert v. Working, 599 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Alaska 1979); Nelson v. Busby, 246
Ark. 247, 254-55, 437 S.W.2d 799, 803 (1969); Hamm v. City of Milton, 358 So. 2d 121, 123
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); White v. Lunder, 66 Wis. 2d 563, 574, 225 N.W.2d 442, 449
(1975); cf. Fuller v. Buhrow, 292 N.W.2d 672, 676 (Iowa 1980) (loss of consortium deemed
independent in contributory negligence jurisdiction). But see Feltch v. General Rental Co.,
421 N.E.2d 67, 71 (Mass. 1981) (3 months prior to Maidman decision, Massachusetts joined
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approach, because it engenders equitable results, largely moots
criticisms authored in the contributory negligence era.22 Indeed, ir-
respective of the conceptual soundness of designating the loss of
consortium cause of action "independent," '28 the value of doing so
in a comparative negligence jurisdiction is questionable, since the
net economic impact upon the marital unit in such jurisdiction is
not, as in a contributory negligence jurisdiction, controlled by the
derivative or independent status of the loss of consortium claim.24
Conversely, only the extent of the injured spouse's negligence is
determinative of the magnitude of the consortium spouse's re-
covery.25
Because such a result was one of the principal rationales for
terming loss of consortium causes of action independent in the first
instance,2" the sole remaining distinction between derivative and
independent loss of consortium causes of action appears to involve
minority).
22 The Maidman court noted that application of comparative negligence principles to
the consortium plaintiff's award would work an equitable result since the defendant would
not have to pay more than his share of the consortium damages and the injured spouse
would not indirectly collect more than his due. 82 App. Div. 2d at 306, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 716;
see Abbate v. Big V. Supermarkets, Inc., 95 Misc. 2d 483, 485, 407 N.Y.S.2d 821, 823 (Sup.
Ct. Orange County 1978) (full consortium recovery results in unfairness to defendant).
23 See notes 1 & 16 supra.
24 When a court in a contributory negligence jurisdiction views the loss of consortium
claim as derivative in nature, the spouse cannot recover any damages if the injured spouse
was contributorily negligent. See Gilmore, supra note 1, at 211-12; James, supra note 1, at
354-55; Note, Loss of Consortium, supra note 16, at 257-58. Conversely, if the court views
the claim as independent of the ersonal injury action, the spouse can recover all of her loss
of consortium damages, regardless of the injured spouse's negligence. See Fuller v. Buhrow,
292 N.W.2d 672, 676 (Iowa 1980). In comparative negligence jurisdictions, however, loss of
consortium damages are recoverable regardless of whether the action is deemed derivative
or independent. Compare Feltch v. General Rental Co., 421 N.E.2d 67, 71 (Mass. 1981) (loss
of consortium is an independent claim and spouse may recover all damages) with Maidman
v. Stagg, 82 App. Div. 2d at 306, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 715 (loss of consortium is derivative in
nature and spouse may recover to the extent that negligent spouse was not at fault).
22 See, e.g., Eggert v. Working, 599 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Alaska 1979); Maidman v. Stagg,
82 App. Div. 2d at 306, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 715. There does appear to be one situation in which
the degree of fault attributable to the negligent spouse will not be inversely proportional to
the magnitude of the consortium spouse's recovery in a comparative negligence jurisdiction,
namely, when the loss of consortium cause of action is deemed independent of the personal
injury claim and the defendant has no right of contribution. See Feltch v. General Rental
Co., 421 N.E.2d 67, 71-72 (Mass. 1981); cf. Macon v. Seaward Constr. Co., 555 F.2d 1, 3 (1st
Cir. 1977) (court construing New Hampshire law was uncertain whether a defendant would
be compelled to pay more than his share).
26 See, e.g., Fuller v. Buhrow, 292 N.W.2d 672, 676 (Iowa 1980); Comment, Husband
and Wife-Negligence-Contributory Negligence of Wife as Bar to Action by Husband for
Consequential Damages-Thibeault v. Poole, 13 B.U.L. REv. 725, 728 (1933).
1981]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:171
placement of the initial burden of liability. If a loss of consortium
cause of action is deemed independent, the full burden, at the out-
set, will be placed upon the defendant. If, however, the loss of
consortium cause of action is considered derivative, the burden of
liability will be shared by the defendant and, to the extent of the
spouse's negligence, by the consortium plaintiff.28 It is submitted
that, procedurally, the latter approach is preferable. Of course,
mere pro rata reduction is less cumbersome, since it obviates the
need for a counterclaim for contribution.2 9 Moreover, CPLR 1412
seems to mandate such an approach. The statute provides that
contributory negligence is an affirmative defense which the defen-
dant must plead and prove.30 In addition, several courts have held
that section 1412 precludes the defendant from counterclaiming
against the negligent spouse for contribution for consortium
damages."1
The Maidman decision, which sanctions diminution of the
consortium claimant's recovery when the defendant properly has
pleaded the injured spouse's contributory negligence,32 reaffirms
New York's policy of assessing damages concomitantly with fault.3
27 See Lantis v. Condon, 95 Cal. App. 3d 152, 159-60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22, 26 (1979); Love,
supra note 1, at 631 n.237.
28 See, e.g., Maidman v. Stagg, 82 App. Div. 2d at 306-07, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 716.
29 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in White v. Lunder, 66 Wis. 2d 563, 225 N.W.2d
442 (1975), noted that reduction in the first instance simplifies application of a comparative
negligence statute. Id. at 574, 225 N.W.2d at 449; see Love, supra note 1, at 631-32 n.237.
30 CPLR 1412 provides that "[c]ulpable conduct claimed in diminution of damages, in
accordance with section fourteen hundred eleven, shall be an affirmative defense to be
pleaded and proved by the party asserting the defense." CPLR 1412 (1976).
11 Two courts have determined that a defendant's counterclaim for contribution against
a negligent spouse was unwarranted, since CPLR 1412 required the defendant to plead com-
parative negligence as an affirmative defense. See Abbate v. Big V. Supermarkets, Inc., 95
Misc. 2d 483, 485, 407 N.Y.S.2d 821, 823 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1978); Lieberman v.
Maltz, 99 Misc. 2d 112, 113, 415 N.Y.S.2d 382, 383 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Kings County 1979). In
Lane v. Great Atl. & Pac. Co., N.Y.L.J., Nov. 3, 1980, at 12, col. 2 (Sup. Ct App. T. lt
Dep't), the court directed the jury to find both the degree of fault of the plaintiff and the
sum representing the total damages otherwise recoverable by the consortium claimant in
order to assess the proportionate abatement of the consortium award. Id.; cf. Meyer v.
State, 92 Misc. 2d 996, 1006, 403 N.Y.S.2d 420, 427-28 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (parents' action for
medical expenses).
"2 Maidman v. Stagg, 82 App. Div. 2d at 306-07, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 716.
33 See THIRTEENTH ANN. REP. OF THE JUD. CONFERENCE ON THE CPLR (1975), in
TWENTY-FIRST ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE 232, 238-39 (1976); SIEGEL, § 468, at 627-28
(party's liability assessed in accord with his responsibility for damages); cf. id. § 172 (CPLR
Article 14 allows contribution among joint tortfeasors in proportion to each's responsibility).
A 1974 bill proposing the institution of a comparative negligence statute which would bar
from recovery plaintiffs who were more than 50% negligent was vetoed because it would
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To the extent that the harsh consequences of contributory negli-
gence are mitigated by New York's comparative negligence statute,
the necessity for an independent consortium action is diminished,
since preservation of the consortium spouse's suit no longer is a
genuine concern. Hence, it is expected that other New York courts
will follow the lead of the Maidman court and will apply compara-
tive negligence principles to derivative loss of consortium claims.
William R. Moriarty
Banking Law § 673: Violations of civil banking regulations held
to constitute criminal misapplication of bank funds
Section 673 of the New York Banking Law3 4 provides that a
bank officer who "abstracts or willfully misapplies" a bank's funds,
property or credit is guilty of a felony.35 Interpreting the predeces-
sor statute,3 6 the Court of Appeals has stated that a bank officer
can be convicted of willful misapplication without a showing of an
intent to injure or defraud.37 Moreover, an officer who "knowingly"
uses bank funds in a manner not authorized by law to benefit him-
self possesses a sufficiently criminal state of mind to be convicted
under the provision.3 8 Recently, in People v. Kagan s9 the Appel-
have prolonged the harshness of the contributory negligence rule. THIRTEENTH ANN. REP. OF
THE JUD. CONFERENCE ON THE CPLR (1975), in TWENTY-FIRST ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. CONFER-
ENCE 232, 238-39 (1976).
N.Y. BANKING LAW § 673 (McKinney 1971).
" Section 673 of the Banking Law provides:
Any officer, director, trustee, employee or agent of any corporation to which
the banking law is applicable, or any employee or agent of any private banker,
who abstracts or wilfully misapplies any of the money, funds or property of such
corporation or private banker, or wilfully misapplies its or his credit, is guilty of a
felony. Nothing in this section shall be deemed or construed to repeal, amend or
impair any existing provision of law prescribing a punishment for any such
offense.
Id.
36 Section 673, enacted pursuant to ch. 1031, § 18 [1965] N.Y. Laws 1757, was originally
part of the penal law. See ch. 185, § 11 [1939] N.Y. Laws 2281 (current version at N.Y.
BANKING LAW § 673 (McKinney 1971)).
'7 People v. Marcus, 261 N.Y. 268, 278, 185 N.E. 97, 99 (1933); see People v. Kresel, 243
App. Div. 137, 141, 277 N.Y.S. 168, 174 (3rd Dep't 1935); People v. Berardini, 150 Misc. 311,
314, 269 N.Y.S. 381, 384 (N.Y.C. Gen. Sess. N.Y. County 1934). Marcus and Kresel arose
out of the same factual situation.
People v. Marcus, 261 N.Y. 268, 277-78, 185 N.E. 97, 98-99 (1933). In Marcus, two
bank officers borrowed money from the bank in order to satisfy debts incurred by corpora-
tions which they controlled. Id. at 276, 185 N.E. at 97-98. Because the loan exceeded the
